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ABSTRACT
A stochastic two—country neoclassical rational expectations model
with sticky prices ——optimallyset by monopolistically competitive firms ——
andpossible excess capacity is developed to examine international spillover
effects on output of monetary disturbances. The Mundell—Fleming model
predicts that monetary expansion at home leads to recession abroad. In
contrast, our main result is that spillover effects of monetary policy may be
either positive or negative, depending upon whether the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption exceeds the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution. The model in addition is used to determine nominal and real
inteest rates, exchange rates, and other asset prices.
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I. Introduction
The debates on the shift in US monetary policy since late 1979 vividly
demonstrate the importance of the international transmission of the effects of
monetary policy. The shift to stricter money targets in 1979 has by nny been
associated with at least the initial rise in the US dollar exchange rate and the
worldwide slump that followed upon this shift in monetary operating procedures.
However, the theoretical basis for such an assessment of the transmission of
monetary policy in the existing literature is not entirely satisfactory in several
respects.
Existing international neoclassical monetary models models with flexible
prices and continuously clearing markets, like Stockman (1980). Lucas (1982) and
Svensson (l985a), while useful as benchmarks, fail to address the sluggishness in
price and wage adjustment, arid relatively large adjustment in output and
employment, that seem a persistent feature of macroeconomic fluctuations. The
models mentioned have exogenous output, and hence cannot incorporate any effects
of monetary disturbances on output. Also, the price level in these models is as
variable as any asset price, like exchange rates and stock prices, and jumps
instantaneously when new information arrives. We believe these models exaggerate
the variability of the price level. Models that explicitly incorporate the
possibility of sticky prices usually suffer, however, from a series of well known
shortcomings. Typically, price setting rules are arbitrarily assumed rather than
linked to rational behavior of the price setting agents in the economy. Moreover,
in spite of the obvious incompatibility of price setting behavior on the one hand,
and assumptions of perfect competition on the other, firm behavior is typically
based on the assumption of the latter market structure. Often, intertemporal
issues concerning expectations, savings and investment behavior are treated in a
static context, precluding a meaningful analysis; and so on. While individual2
papers are emerging dealing with each of theseissues,1 no satisfactory framework
has as yet been developed for a full analysis of the international transmission of
monetary policy shocks.
Of course, the Mundell—Fleming model,2 still to a large extent the workhorse
of international macroeconomics, can be considered as an early sticky—price model,
with Keynesian unemployment and excess commodity supply prevailing throughout the
world. It leads to strong conclusions about international transmission of monetary
policy. Let us consider, for instance, the two—country version with flexible
exchange rates and perfect capital mobility, the straigth—forward
flexible—exchange—rate extension of the fixed price IS—LM model with demand
determined output.
An expansion of the foreign money supply leads in that model to an incipient
capital outflow from the foreign country into the home country, an appreciation of
the home currency, and an improvement in the home country's terms of trade. This
deteriorates the home country's trade balance, and depresses demand for home
output. The world rate of interest falls. Since the home interest rate is equal to
the world interest rate by the assumption of perfect capital mobility, the home
interest rate falls as well. In the new equilibrium, home money market equilibrium
requires that home output has fallen. The home country's trade account has
deteriorated. Foreign output has expanded. A monetary expansion is in this sense
beggar-thy—neighbor policy.
The IS—LM and hence the Mundell—Fleming model has obvious and well-known
weaknesses. The behavioral functions, including the money demand functions, are
not derived from intertemporal optimizing behaviour. Expectations are stationary.
For instance, Aizenman (1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1986) and Svensson
(1986) use monopolistic competition; Persson (1982) and van Wijnbergen (1985)
introduce savings and investment behavior based on intertemporal optimizing
behavior in a fix—price model.
2
Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1968). For a modern restatement, see Dornbusch
(1980).3
Saving, investment and the trade balance are treated without regard for the
intertemporal considerations thatshouldbe inherent in saving and investment
decisions. These shortcomings often qualitatively affect the results, as
comparision with this paper demonstrates.
Considerable effort has been devoted in the international macro field to
remedy these inadequacies, and itwouldtake to long here to survey the major
developments. Let us however note one particular development. Recently rigorous
two—country monetary general equilibrium models with rational expectations and
uncertainty have been developed and used in international finance. These models
are essentially monetary and international extensions of Lucas (1978) celebrated
model, like Lucas (1982), Stockman (1980). Svensson (1985a) and Stockmari and
Svensson (1987). These models rely on full employment and flexible prices. More
recently, Svensson (1986) has shown one way of incorporating sticky goods prices
and demand determined output with maintained rigour in these models, although in a
closed economy setting. Here we extend Svensson (1986) to a two—country flexible
exchange rate setting, in order to examine the strong results of the
Mundell—Flemirig model in a more rigorous framework. The new results obtained
clearly demonstrate the positive payoff of such effects. We also hope that our
model will in general provide a more satisfactory framework for the analysis of
international transmission of international disturbances.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In section II we present the
model. In section III we discuss the output effects of monetary disturbances.
Section IV discusses the impact of monetary disturbances on interest rates.
Section V concludes. Some technical details are presented in an appendix.
II. The Model
The world consists of two countries, home and foreign. Each country is
completely specialized in the production of home and foreign goods, respectively.
As further specified below, there is production of differentiated products, but at4
this stage it is sufficient to consider two aggregate goods only. In period t
(t =..., —1.0. 1. ...)worldper capita production of each good, and Y,
respectively, is costless up to an exogenous stochastic capacity level, y arid y.
Hence
(1)
There is a representative consumer in each country. Hence world population is 2,
and world production of the two goods is and 2YI, respectively.
Goods are perishable arid cannot be stored between periods. Hence, whenever
output and consumption fall short of capacity there is waste of resources, excess
capacity, and underemployment.3
There are two currencies, home and foreign. The supply of currencies in
period t, and N, respectively, is stochastic and given by
(2) = andN =wN1.
where and are the (gross rates of) monetary expansion of home arid foreign
currency. We call the vector s = the state. We assume that the
states are serially independently distributed, and that their probability
distribution is given by the time—invariant probability distribution function
F(s).
The home and the foreign consumer have identical preferences. Let us consider
the situation f or the home consumer. His preferences in period t are given by the
expected utility function
Tt
(3) ETP u(chT.cfr). 0 < p<1.
Here denotes the expectations operator conditional upon information available
in period t; u(ch.cf) is a standard concave instantaneous utility function of
consumption Cht arid cf of home and foreign goods in period t.
With a different interpretation of the model, assuming a linear technology
with labor input and goods output, Y and can be identified as actual
endogenous labor employment and exogenous labor supply, respectively. Then we can
interpret excess capacity directly as unemployment.5
Thetiming of markets and transactions facing the consumer needs to be
specified. We shall explain it in some detail for the home consumer. The home
consumer enters period t with stocks of six different assets, namely home and
foreign currency. Mr_i and Ni. shares in home and foreign firms,Zhtl and
Zftl. arid claims to transfers of home and foreign currency. XMt_l arid x_1.4
Then he learns the current states of current capacities and monetary expansions.
and he receives money transfers of home and foreigncurrency, in proportion to his
claims on such transfers. After that, the goods marketopens. On the goods market
the consumer can buy home and foreign goods. He mustpay f or home goods with home
currency and for foreign goods with foreign currency. Hence he faces the liquidity
constraints
(4a) Phch￿M1+(wt_1)itlxMtland
(4b) PtCft ￿ + ((L)_l)NlxNtl.
where ht and is the home—currency price of home goods and the foreign
currencyprice of foreign goods, respectively,and wherethe second terms on the
righthandsidesare the transfers received.
Sincenominal goods prices will be sticky and not adjust to the current state
of the market, there will be excess demand in some states andexcess supply in
others. When there is excess demand consumers will be rationed. Therefore the home
consumer also faces the rationing constraints
(5)
(recall that and Y are output per capita). We assume uniform rationing such
that home and foreign consumers are treated equally when there isrationing on the
markets for home and foreign goods.
After the consumer's transactions on the goods market, that market closes and
Home consumers receive transfers of home currency, and foreign consumers
receive foreign currency. Risk averse consumers have an incentive to diversify
their portfolio. This gives rise to trade in claims on net transfers ofcurrency
(see Lucas (1982)).6
the asset market opens. On the asset market, dividends on shares in firms (cash
from sales of output) are distributed and the consumer can trade assets according
to the budget constraint





+ e[Ni + (w_l)N1XNt 1 -tcft]+ ht + PhtYt)zht1+
+ ft + e PY3*)zf + RMtxMtl + RNtXNt1
Here et is the exchange rate, and are the home currency prices of shares
in home arid foreign firms, and RMt and RNt are the home currency prices of claims
to transfers of home arid foreign currency. The inequality (6) simply states that
the value of end—of—period asset stocks plus the value of current period
consumption cannot exceed the value of asset stocks carried over from the previous
period plus current period income. After these transactions the asset market
closes, and the home consumer leaves period t and enters period t+l with new
stocks of his six assets: M. N. Zht. Zft. XMt and XNt.
The home consumer will maximize expected utility (3) subject to the sequence
of liquidity, rationing arid budget constraints (4)—(6). The foreign consumer will
maximize the same utility function, with the same constraints, only his variables
are denoted by '*',likec, c. M. N. etc.
Firms' price setting behavior is modelled as in Svensson (1986), by
introducing differentiated products and monopolistic competition along the lines
of Dixit and Stiglitz (l977). As is further specified in the Appendix, home
(foreign) firms produce differentiated home (foreign) goods in monopolistic
competition. Firms set prices in their own currency.6 For some reason they must
See Aizenman (1985), BlanchardandKiyotaki(1986), Dornbusch (1987) and
Giovannini(1985) •for alternative price setting stories.Aizenman makes the price
setting period endogenous.
6
See Giovannini (1985) for an analysis of what determines whether firms prefer
to set prices in home or foreign currency.7
set prices one period in advance, that is, before the current state is known.This
could be because it takes time to implement a price change. or because the firms
cannot observe the current state of the economy except with a lag. For instance,
firms may not be able to observe their demand and infere the state of the economy
until the end of the week, whereas they must post a price at the beginning of the
week. Thus, own—currency goods prices ht+l arid will be predetermined and
prices in period t+l can only depend on the state variables in period t. These
will turn out to be the state s, the money stocks M..i and N1, and the
predetermined price levels ht and The pricing functions are the result of
the home and foreign firms maximizing their stock market values. However, since
the states are serially uncorrelated, the current state conveys no information
about the state of tomorrow's markets. Hence, the pricing will be to some extent
independent of the current state. Also, there is no money illusion in this world.
The outcome is that prices for period t+l are set proportionally to the stocks of
money in period t. It follows that the pricing functions (assumed stationary) have
the simple form
(7) ht+1 == wi/kand = =
wherethe constants k and kM are determined by the first—order conditions for
maximization of stock market values (see Appendix for details).
We consider a perfectly pooled equilibrium, where the home and foreign
consumer hold identical portfolios and consume identical quantities of the goods.
That is, they hold the same per capita share of world asset stocks and consume the
same per capita share of world output of each good: half of world quantities. Then

















Note that total output is and 2Y, total money stocks 2M and 2N. and that
total quantity of each other asset is normalized to equal 2. The inequalities in
the goods market equilibrium conditions (Ba) allow for the possibility of excess
supply and underutilization of resources.
The first—order conditions for the consumers and their liquidity, rationing
and budget constraints, together with the pricing functions (7) and the market
equilibrium conditions (8). determine the equilibrium. The equilibrium is the
usual stationary stochastic rational expectations equilibrium, where realizations
of the endogenous variables in period t are given as time—independent functions of
realizations of the exogenous state, the vector of capacities and monetary
expansions, in period t.
At this stage we do not need to discuss the equilibrium conditions in further
detail. (The determination of the equilibrium is further discussed in the
Appendix.) It is sufficient to note that equilibrium home and foreign output are
given by the reduced form output functions
(9) Y(y.y.w,w) and YM(y,yM,w,wE).
where we have dropped the time subscripts. As further specified below, the precise
functional form of (9) will depend on which regime the economy is in, namely
whether liquidy constraints or capacity constraints are binding in one, both, or
none of the markets for home home and foreign goods.
One can also solve for the other endogenous variables: the exchange rate, the
terms of trade, nominal and real interest rates, stock market values, etc. Some of
these variables are further discussed below.
III. Output Effects of Monetary Disturbances
We are interested in the effect on home output of a foreign monetary
expansion.Letus first note thattheexperiment considered is a serially
uncorrelated shock to the growth rate of the foreign money stock, which is
equivalent to a permanentshockto the level of the foreign monely stock. This is9
equivalent to the usual experiment in the Mundell—Fleming model.
In terms of the output functions (9). we like to find the partial derivative
of home output with respect to foreign monetary expansion, Y.7 In order to
understand how this partial is determined, we need to understand the nature of the
equilibrium in more detail. There are two goods markets, the (world) markets for
home and for foreign goods. Each of these markets can be in one of three possible
regimes, depending upon the realization of capacities and monetary expansions
which determines what combination of capacity and liquidity constraints is
binding. There are hence nine possible regimes all together. (The regimes are
specified in detail in the Appendix.)
It is practical to start with the market for foreign goods. We will need to
understand how a foreign monetary expansion affects foreign output, that is, what
determines the derivative Y. We call the three possible regimes for the foreign
goods market the full capacity regime, the liquidity constrained regime, and the
underconsumption regime, respectively, and we label them FE, L* and U*. The full
capacity regime is the one when consumers are rationed in foreign goods (the
rationing constraint (5) binds for foreign goods), and consumption and output of
foreign goods is equal to capacity. In this regime foreign output Is independent
of foreign monetary expansion:
(ba)Y=yM, soY=O (F9*).
The full capacity regime is the only one where there is no waste of resources.
The liquidity constrained regime is the one when consumers' liquidity
constraint (4b) for foreign currency is binding. Then consumption and output of
foreign goods equal real balances in foreign currency. These real balances are
which by the pricing function (7) equal kw* and are proportional to the
foreign monetary expansion. Hence, in the liquidity constrained regime, foreign
The output functions are not differentiable on the borderline of the regimes
specifed in the Appendix. Hence, derivatives are defined for the interior of the
regimes.10
output is given by
(lOb) Y =ksw,so Y =k> 0 (L*),
and foreign output is proportional to foreign monetary expansion.
In the underconsumption regime. neither the capacity constraint nor the
liquidity constraint is binding. There consumption and output of foreign goods is
determined by the first—order condition that the marginal utility of consumption
of foreign goods. uf(ch.cf). equals the marginal utility of wealth measured in
foreign goods. ? (the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint (6) when the
latter is deflated by the foreign currency price of foreign goods. Pr). Hence, in
equilibrium
(lOc) uf(Y.Y3*) =
wherewe have substituted home and foreign output for consumption of home and
foreign goods. (In general this first-order condition is uf(Y.YE) =X+ +
where and are the Lagrange multipliers of the liquidity constraint (4b) and
the foreign goods rationing constraint in (5).) The marginal utility of wealth
measured in foreign currency also fulfills the first—order condition for foreign
currency holdings.
(lOd) =13E[(Xv' + )/P'].
Expectations are conditional upon information available in the current period, and
variables with a primereferto variables next period. Equation (lOd) is an
asset—pricing equation for foreign currency. The variable j.i' is the Lagrange
multiplier of the foreign—currency liquidity constraint next period, and can be
interpreted as the liquidity services of foreign real balances next period. The
equation states that the current value of money reflects its future "resale" value
on next period's asset market and the liquidity services the money stock will
provide on next period's commodity market. From the pricing function (7) and from
the assumption that shocks are serially uncorrelated. we can write ClOd) as
(l0e) =AM/w3,11
where AM =f3E[?M'+j.t'] isconstant. The marginal utility of wealth measured in
foreign goods is inversely proportional to the foreign monetary expansion. This is
so since the current marginal utility of next period's foreign currency real
balances, AM, is constant, and the rate of deflation. F/P', for the given
pricing function is inversely proportional to the foreign monetary expansion.
Hence, the current marginal utility of wealth measured in foreign goods, is
completely determined by the asset—pricing equation for foreign currency.
Finally, it follows from (lOc) and (lOe) that for constanthomeoutput.
foreign output is increasing in foreign monetary expansion in the underconsumption
region. This is so because an increase in foreign monetary expansion decreases the
marginal utility of wealth measured in foreign goods. For the marginal utility of
consumption of foreign goods to fall, consumption and output of foreign goods must
rise. It can be shown (see Appendix A.3) that consumption and output of foreign
goods must rise also when home output is allowed to adjust. We conclude that
foreign output indeed rises with foreign monetary expansion in the
underconsumption region,
(lOf) > 0 (UM).
This completes our examination of the effect on foreign output of a foreign
monetary expansion. Intuitively it is clear what is happening in the different
regimes. With full capacity, consumption and output of foreign goods are
restricted by the available capacity, and a foreign monetary expansion has no
effect. In the liquidity constrained regime, consumption and output is restricted
by real balances of foreign currency, and a foreign monetary expansion directly
relaxes the foreign—currency liquidity constraint and increases consumption and
output of foreign goods. In the underconsumption regime, increased transfers of
foreign currency due to the foreign monetary expanision are, partly at least,
spent on foreign goods.
A more precise way to to understand the effect on foreign output is with12
reference to intertemporal substitution. A current foreign monetary expansion
implies that next period's foreign currency price of foreign goods increases. The
current foreign currency price of foreign goods is predetermined. As we shall see
in section IV below, perhaps somewhat surprisingly the foreign nominal interest
rate remains unchanged. Then current foreign goods are becoming cheaper relative
to next period's foreign goods; the foreign—good real rate of interest falls, and
there is substitution in favor of current foreign goods. A second interpretation
is to note that increased foreign inflation makes foreign currency real balances
less attractive to hold, so consumers spend some of their foreign currency real
balances on foreign goods.
Next we need to understand the effect on home output of a foreign monetary
expansion. The three possible regimes in the home goods market, the full capacity
regime, the liquidity constrained regime, and the underconsumption regime, are
denoted by F, L and U. In the full capacity regime, home output is given by home
capacity, and there is no effect of foreign monetary expansion.
(ha) Y =y,so =0 (F).
In the liquidity constrained regime, home output is constraind by home currency
real balances. By the same argument as above, these real balances are given by kw.
We thus have.
(lib) Y =kw,so =0 (L).
and again there is no effect of foreign monetary expansion on home output. In the
underconsumption regime, finally, consumption and output of foreign goods is
implicitly given by the first—order condition
(lic) uh(Y,YM) == A/w (U).
The marginal utility of consumption of home goods equals the marginal utility of
wealth measured in home goods, X (the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint
(6) when the latter is deflated by the home goods price of home goods). (In
general the first—order condition is uh(Y.Y) =X+
1'h
+vh.where and Vh are13
the Lagrange multipliers of the home currency liquidity constraint(4a) and the
home goods rationing constraint in (5).) By an argument symmetric to theone
preceding (lOe), the marginal utility of wealth measured in home goods is
inversely proportional to the home monetary expansion (the second equality in
(lic)), and independent of foreign monetary expansion. It follows that the effect
on home output of foreign monetary expansion is determined exclusively by how
changes in consumption of foreign goods affects the marginal utility of
consumption of home goods. Differentiating (lic), we can write
(lid) Y($E =[uhf/(uhh)]Y (U).
Whether home output moves with or against foreignoutput has only to do with
whether the cross derivativeuhf is positive or negative, that is, whether home
and foreign goods are Edgeworth—Pareto complementsor substitutes.
Finally, combining (10) and (lid) we can write
(12) Y 0 if and only if Uhf0 (U;L,U).
To sum up, when the home market is in the underconsumptionregime, and the foreign
market is in the liquidity constrained or the underconsumptionregime, the effect
on home output of a foreign monetary expansion is positive ornegative depending
upon whether home and foreing goods are Edgeworth-pareto complements and
substitutes. In all other regimes, the effect is zero. In otherwords, there is an
effect of foreign monetary expansion on homeoutput only if there is an effect on
foreign output. There is an effect on foreign output only when theforeign market
is in the liquidity constrained or in the underconsumptionregime. Furthermore,
there is an effect on home output only when the homegoods market is in the
underconsumption regime, that is when neither the liquidity constraint or the
capacity constraint is binding.
Thus, the entire transmission of the effect of foreign monetary disturbances
on home output seems to take place' through the effect of a change in output and
consumption of foreign goods on the marginal utility of home goods. Then the14
standard Mundell—Fleming result is contradicted if home and foreign goods are
Edgeworth-Pareto complements.
In order to further clarify this result, we first note that whether goods are
Edgeworth—Pareto complements or substitutes depends on the difference between the
iritertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution. To see this, we consider the nested CES utility
function
(13a) u(chcf) =U(ch,cf)l
h/'a/(1 —1/a).a > 0, a1, and
u(ch.cf) =logU(ch.cf) a =1,where
(l3b) U(ch.cf) = +(l_T)cf11I5]1/1),
s > 0. s1, and
U(ch.cf) =chCf.s=1.
That is, a is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, and s
is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption between home and
foreign goods. Then, as shown in the Appendix. the sign of the cross-derivative




If intertemporal substitution dominates over intratemporal substitution, goods are
Edgeworth—Pareto complements, otherwise they are Edgeworth—Pareto substitutes.
Thus equipped, we can interpret our results. To understand the role of
intratemporal substitution, we note that the terms of trade p =eP/Ph
fulfill
(15) p =X/?=(AM/A)(/WM),
wherewe have exploited that the terms of trade equal the ratio of the marginal
utility of real wealth measured in foreign goods to the marginal utility of real
wealth measured in home goods (the first equality in (15)). the expressions for
which we have derived in (lOd) and (l0e). Hence the terms of trade are
proportional to the ratio between home and foreign monetary expansion (the second15
eqaulity in (15)). Also, it is easy to see that the exchange rate8 will be
proportional to the ratio of the stocks of home and foreign currency and given by9
(16) e =(AAk9*)(M/*) =(Ak/Ak)(wM1/wNM1).
From (16) it is clear that a foreign monetary expansion directly decreases
the exchange rate (appreciates the home currency). With predetermined goods
prices, the home country's terms of trade then improve in proportion to the
foreign monetary expansion, and home goods become relatively expensive. Consumers
substitute away from home goods, and demand for and output of home goods fall. The
amount of such intratemporal substitution away from home goods is measured by the
intratemporal elasticity of substitutions s.
However, a foreign monetary expansion also leads to a proportional increase
in next period's foreign currency price of foreign goods, because of the pricing
behavior of foreign firms. Since, as mentioned before and shown in section IV, the
foreign nominal interest rate remains constant, the aggregate of next period's
goods becomes more expensive relative to current goods. This induces intertemporal
substitution away from next period's goods into current goods. This increases
demand for and output of home goods. The amount of such inter temporal substitution
into home goods is measured by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution a. The
Note that this exchange rate is the one that rules on the asset market after
the goods market is closed. The terms of trade (15) are here defined from that
exchange rate although goods are actually not traded directly against each other
at relative prices equal to those terms of trade. (They are traded against
currencies).
One can consider a different exchange rateon a hypothetical currency
market that opens after the current state is knownbutbefore goods market opens.
A different definition of the terms of trade can then be used, ="h'In
regimes without rationing of consumers, the terms of trade so defined equal the
ratio of marginal utilities, uf(ch.cf)/uh(ch.cf). When both markets are in the
underconsumption region, the two exchange rates and terms of trade coincide. See
Svensson (1985a, Section 5) and Stockman and Svensson (1987) on the properties of
these alternative definitions of term of trade, and exchange rates.
Note that with the serially uncorrelated shocks the log of the exchange rate
is a random walk.16
net effect depends on the difference between a and s.
In summary, a foreign monetary expansion has a first effect by appreciating
the home currency arid affecting the relative price of home and foreign goods. This
induces substitution away from home goods, and a fall in home output. This effect
is also present in the Mundell—Fleming model. In addition, a foreign monetary
expansion has a second effect by increasing foreign inflation and affecting the
intertemporal relative price between current goods and future goods (lowering the
foreign—goods real interest rate). which induces substitution in favor of current
goods. and an increase in home output. This effect is either missing in the
Mundell—Fleming model (when expenditure arid saving is assumed independent of the
real interest rate) or, if present, always dominated by the the first effect.
The reason the second effect is always dominated in the Mundell—Fleming model
is that the decrease in the nominal interest rate caused by the foreign monetary
expansion increases demand for home currency. Home money market equilibrium then
requires a fall in home output (the transactions variable in the home money demand
function). In our case, as both the foreign and home nominal interest rates
remains unchanged (which will be demonstrated in section IV).wemight expect the
money market equilibrium to enforce a constant home output. However, in the
underconsumption regime the home currency liquidity constraint is not binding and
home currency holdings do not stand in a one—to—one relation to home output.
These results clearly demonstrate the payoff attached to the more careful
approach to microeconomic underpinnings of this paper. Explicit attention to price
setting and intertemporal decision-making has brought the intertemporal
substitution channel effectively ignored in the standard Mundell—Fleming model
into the foreground; a careful micro—based analysis of portfolio demand and asset
pricing has shown how the usual ad hoc money demand function used in the
?4undell—Flerning models arbitrarily restricts the results.17
IV. Nominal and Real Interest Rates
We first consider the effect of a foreign monetary expansion on nominal rates
of interest at home and abroad. One over one plus the nominal interest rate equals
the present value, measured in money terms, of a sure unit of nominal money paid





Using the first—order conditions for currency holdings (lOd), and its analog for
home currency, we can write
(17c) I =E[/P]/E[X'/P];i =E['/P']/E[X3'/P'],
where .zh (p3f) is the liquidity services of home (foreign) real balances (the
Lagrange multiplier for the home (foreign) currency liquidity constraint).
The nominal interest rate hence equals the ratio between expected future
liquidity services of money, E[ji/P]. and the expected utility of future nominal
wealth, E[\'/P]. The interpretation is straightforward: both money and a nominal
bond have an end—of—period value equal to one unit of money. During the holding
period, money alone yields liquidity services valued at E[ii/P]. To offset that
advantage, bonds need to pay interest of equal value, so market clearing requires
iE[X'/P] =E[ç/P].which immediately yields (17c).
The effect of a foreign monetary expanions on nominal interest rates is most
easily derived by rewriting (17b) by using the pricing functions (7) and the
expression for marginal utility of wealth measured in home goods (llc) to









Both home and foreign nominal interest rates are independent of foreign monetary
expansion
The explanation of this maybe somewhat surprizing result is easily seen from
equation (17). A temporary (that is. serially uncorrelated) foreign monetary
disturbance will affect next period's foreign price level one for one, since P' =
thiswill reduce the liquidity service of foreign (nominal) money next
period (E['/P'] =E[ji'J/P').
but in the same proportion as it reduces the
marginal utility of nominal wealth measured in foreign currency (E[\M'/P'] =
E[?*']/P').
Hence the relative attractiveness of foreign nominal bonds and
foreign money remains unchanged and the nominal interest rate will not be affected
at all. The home price level depends on home monetary expansion only, so it will
not be affected by foreign monetary expansion; the argument therefore holds a
fortiori for domestic nominal interest rates.
A different story emerges for real interest rates. Real rates can be derived
from the present value of a future unit of wealth measured in terms of home goods
or foreign goods, to derive home and foreign (own—good) real rates of interest.
respectively:
(20) l+p =X/13E[X']and H-pM =XM/pE[XM'].
Substitution for the marginal utility of wealth measured in home and foreign
goods, and using the expressions (18) for the nominal interest rates, we can write
(21) H-p =!.1..1+pM=
Sincethe rate of inflation is known once current monetary shocks have been
observed, the Fisher relation holds exactly, and one plus the real interest rate
equals one plus the nominal interest rate divided by the rate ofinflation.°
10It is well known that when the rate of inflation is stochastic, the Fisher
relation does no longer hold exactly. See Svensson (19S5b) for an extensive
discussion of the Fisher relation in a monetary asset pricing model with random
inflation.19
Since the nominal interest rates are constant, we can conclude that a foreign
monetary expanSiOn decreases the foreign real interest rate since it increases
foreign inflation, but that it has no effect on the home real interest rate since
it does not affect home inflation.
Let us consider an aggregate real interest rate, the real interest rate that
corresponds to a price index.11 That real interest rate will be a weighted average
of the two real interest rates, and it follows that the aggregate real interest
rate falls in response to a foreign monetary expansion. We may then interpret the
intertemporal substitution discussed above as due to a decrease in the aggregate
real interest rate, triggered by the increase in next period's foreign currency
prices of foreign goods.
However, these real interest rates do not necessarily equal the expected
marginal rates of substitution in consumption (minus one); that is, the real rates
of interest on asset markets do not necessarily equal the true consumption rates
of interest between goods markets at different points of time. The home and
foreign (own—goods) consumption rates of interest,and M,aredefined from the
marginal utility of consumption rather than that of wealth,hence'2
(22) l+ =uh/PE[u]and l+pM=uf/PE[uf].
The aggregate consumption interest rate is a weighted average of these two
own—goods consumption interest rates. Temporary changes in the tightness of
capacity and liquidity constraints (measured by changes in the Lagrange
11See Svensson and Razin (1983) for a discussion of terms of trade, consumption
interest rates and price indices.
12The consumption interest rates refer to bonds that are completely liquid.
that is, bonds that are traded and mature at the beginning of the period, after
the current state is known but before the goods market opens. These bonds are not
perfect substitutes to bonds traded at the end of the period, and their interest
rates are hence different. See Svensson (1985b) for further discussion of this
issue.
Giovannini (1987) discusses the importance of less than perfect liquidity of
bonds arid stocks for the effect on interest rates and stock prices of increased
uncertainty in output and monetary growth.20
multipliers) drive a wedge between the consumption rates of interest and the real
rates of interest observed on asset markets.
These distinctions between the the interest rates illuminates the different
spillover effects in different regimes. In particular it clarifies our surprising
result of zero spillover when foreign output is capacity constrained. On first
sight, foreign output capacity constrained should block the intratemporal
substitution effect, but leave the intertemporal one intact, implying a positive
spillover. The reason why that implication is incorrect is related to the
distinction between the real interest rates observed on asset markets and the
consumption interest rates in the following way. Increased demand for foreign
goods left unsatisfied because of a binding capacity constraint leads to a
temporary increase in the corrsponding Lagrange multiplier, i,.Thisincrease is
temporary because shocks are serially uncorrelated. Moreover, the increase will
exactly offset the decline in (since we have uf(Y.Y*) =* +inthe
full—capacity regime). But then the foreign goods consumption rate of interest 9E
remainesunchanged, even though the foreign goods real interest rate pM falls.
Temporary changes in the Lagrange multipliers of the capacity and liquidity
constraints drive a wedge between the consumption interest rates and the real
interest rates observed on the asset markets; this is what eliminates the
intertemporal channel in the case when the foreign capacity constraint is binding.
Feltenstein, Lebow and van Wijnbergen (19S7) provide empirical evidence of the
importance of the link between changes in the tightness of rationing constraints
and the consumption rate of interest.
In the underconsumption regime (U;UM) the Lagrange multipliers on both
constraints equal zero; hence equality between consumption rates of interest and
the corresponding asset market real rates of interest obtains. Therefore the
foreign goods consumption rate of interest p declines in line with the foreign
real rate of interest p. As a consequence a foreign monetary expansion shifts21
consumption from the next period to the current one under this regime.
This shift in consumption towards the current period also happens when the
foreign goods market is liquidity constrained (regime (U;L3*)). In that regime.
foreign monetary expansion not only lowers the marginal utility of wealth XM, but
it also lowers the Lagrange multiplierassociatedwith the liquidity
constraint. Both decrease the marginal utility of consumption of foreign goods. In
this case, therefore, the foreign goods consumption interest rate p defined by
(22) declines even more than the foreign real interest rate p( defined by (20).
V. Conclusions
In this paper we present a new framework for the analysis of international
transmission of policy disturbances. We then apply this framework to a study of
the effects of monetary policy both in the home country and in the rest of the
world.
Our motivation is two—fold: First, a dissatisfaction with the structure of
existing international neoclassical business cycle models, with infinitely
flexible prices. Second. suspicion on spillover effects of monetary policy derived
in Keynesian sticky—price models without proper microeconomic foundation. In this
paper we focus specially on the result obtained within Muridell—Fleming models that
monetary disturbances have negative spillover effects on output. We show that this
result can be rationalized only under specific parameter values.
The framework used is similar to some recent work on open economy
macroeconomics in that savings decisions are derived from optimimizing behaviour
in a full rational—expectations context. We also derive money demand and other
asset choices from maximizing behaviour within a specific transactions technology
(cash—in—advance), but without the counterfactual implication of constant velocity
characterizing many cash-in-advance models. This is achieved following earlier
work of Svensson (l9S5a).
Moreover, we depart frommuchof the recent literature by explicitly22
incorporating the possibility of sticky prices, and excess demand and supply.
which possibility seems to us to be a potentially important aspect of the
transmission of macroeconomic disturbances. This puts us in line with the large
literature on open economy "disequilibrium" models, of which Mundell—Flemirig can
be considered as a special but rather dominating case. However, following recent
work on sticky prices, in particular Svensson (1986), we base price—setting
behaviour in an explicit monopolistic competition structure.
We apply this framework to the analysis of the international transmission of
monetary policy, and find results that are markedly different from the standard
Mundell—Fleming predictions of negative spillovers on output. More specifically we
find that the response to home output of a foreign monetary expansion first of all
depends on what regimes the world markets for home and foreign goods are in, more
precisely whether they are characterized by full capacity, binding liquidity
constraints, or underconsumption. Which regimes the markets are in are determined
by the realization of the stochastic money growth rates and capacity levels in the
home and foreign countries. The underconsumption regimes are most similar to the
Mundell—Fleming setup with excess supply in both countries. In this regime a
foreign monetary expansion has basically two effects. First, it appreciates the
home currency, increases the price of home goods relative to foreign goods. This
induces intratemporal (within period) substitution away from home goods. depresses
demand for and output of home goods, and is hence a negative effect on home
output. This first effect is also present in in the Mundell—Fleming model. Second,
a foreign monetary expansion causes an increase in the future foreign price level.
which makes the aggregate of future goods more expensive relative to current
goods. Equivalently, increased inflation decreases the aggregate consumption real
interest rate. This results in intertemporal (between period) substitution in
favor of current goods, and into current home goods, which stimulates demand for
and output of home goods, and is hence a positive effect on home output. Which23
effect dominates is determined by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption relative to the intraternporal elasticity of substitution. In the
Mundell—Fleming model, this second effect is either ignored (when expenditure and
saving for simplicity is assumed independent of the real interest rate) or always
dominated by the first effect.
Hence, according to this story a monetary contraction in the United States
stimulates output in the rest of the world by the appreciation of the US dollar.
but it depresses output in the rest of the world by increased real interest rates.
With relatively strong intertemporal substitution, the depressing spillover may
dominate.
We furthermore show that a permanent increase in the money supply (a serially
uncorrelated shock to the rate of growth of money) will lead to a fall in the own
real rate of interest of the good produced by the contry expanding its money
supply. The own rate of interest on the other good will not be affected. Also.
foreign arid domestic nominal interest rates are not affected. The latter result
follows from the fact that the serially uncorrelated monetary expansion does
neither affect the future liquidity services of money in the expanding country nor
the future marginal utility of nominal wealth measured in the expanding country's
currency; hence the relativ attractiveness of money and nominal bonds is not
affected.
The results on interest rates confirm a point made by Lucas and Stokey
(1985). It is crucial for the effect on interest rates, and on asset prices in
general, what the information content is of current disturbances. Depending upon
that information content, for instance whether shocks are positively or negatively
serially correlated, asset prices may react one way or another. In our case,
shocks are serially uncorrelated, which means that the shocks have no information
content relevant to the nominal interest rates.
There are some obvious technical limitations, that our analysis shares with24
similar international asset-pricing general equilibrium analyses. One isthe the
assumption of identical home and foreign consumers andthe corresponding reliance
on a perfectly pooled equilibrium. This meansthat home and foreign consumers, by
holding identical portfolios of all the available assets. includingcurrencies.
are identically affected by all disturbances. Hence,wealth and welfare effects
are identical across the twocountries.13 Removing the assumption of identical
consumers remains an urgent task for future research.
14Nevertheless, it seems
that our result on the importance of intertemporal versus intratemporal
substitution should not critically depend on the assumption of perfectly pooled
equilibria.
Also, for technical reasons we can so far only solve the model for serially
uncorrelated shocks. Whith regard to the comparision with the Mundel 1—Fleming
results this is less of a drawback —a serially uncorrelated shock to the growth
rate of money is equivalent to a permanent change in the level of the money stock,
which seems to be how the standard Mundell-Fleming experiment should be
interpreted. Nevertheless, allowing for serial correlation in the shocks remains a
desirable extension.
Overall, we think this paper has demonstrated the positive payoff one can
expect from a more serious approach to intertemporal decision—making, asset
pricing and market structure. Our choice—theoretic approach to intertemporal
decision—making has brought out an intertemporal substitution channel effectively
ignored in the literature on international transmission of monetary shocks. This
channel, we have shown, can reverse standard results under entirely plausible
13 .Thisdoes not exclude capital flows in models with perfectly pooled
equilibria. There are indeed capital flows when the value of home and foreign
(based) assets change, which causes changes in the net foreign asset positionof
home and foreign consumers. See Stockmanand Svensson (1987)for details.
14See Lucas (1982) and Svensson (19S5a) for further discussion of the perfectly
pooled equilibrium, and Svensson (1986) for further discussion of the pricing
model used.25
parameter values. Also, our rigorous approach to consumers' demand for various
assets has shown how money demand functions commonly used in international
economics arbitrarily restricts results.26
Appendix
Al. Derivnrion of the Equilibrium Equat
Introduce the notation
(A.l) X= X, X1 = Xti. X — M1"h' N =e/Ph.p =eP/Ph.
=h'h'qf —-f"1'h' rM =RM/Phand FN =RN/Ph.
























(A.2e) Ch ￿Y and
(A.2f) Cf￿Y.
In a stationary stochastic rational expectations equilibrium the endogenous
variables in period t will be functions of the state variables in period t.
(s,M_l.Nl.1rM.7r). Then the home consumer'sdecision problem to maximize (3)
subject to (A.2) defines, in the usual way, the value function
as the maximum of u(ch.cf) +
subject to (A.2). The first—order conditions,
together with the market equilibrium conditions (8), give
(A.3a) Ch ￿¶MM1h
(A.4a) PCf ￿TNN*Df￿ OJ
(A.3b) Ch 0],
(A.4b) Cf ￿3 [hf￿0],







(A.3f) XrM =j3E[X'r+ (X'+;i)ir(w'—l)M] and
(A.4f) XFN =pE[x'r+ (X'+1.)1r(wM'-l)N3e].
Here X. 1•Lf• u and are the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints (A.2a),
(A.2c). (A.2d). (A.2e) and (A.2f). respectively. Equations (A.3c)—(A.3f) are the
partials of the Lagrarigean with respect to Ch. M, Zh. and XM. whereas (A.4c)—
(A.4f) are the partials with respect to Cf. N. Zf and XN. By the definition of the
value function it will fulfill




which has been exploited in (A.3) and (A.4).
Equations (A.3a) —(A.3d).together with the pricing equation (7), give
(A.6a) Ch ￿ kw ￿0],
(A.6b) Ch ￿ Y 'h ￿ 0].





Then(A.4a) —(A.4d). together with (A.7) and the pricing function (7),give
(A.8a) Cf [i ￿ 0],
(A.8b) Cf ￿ Y* > 0].
(A.8c) uf(ch.cf) =M+ + and
(A.Sd) =A/where A =f3E[X' +if].
The equations/inequalities (A.6) and (A.S) provide the system of functional
equations that need to be solved.
The regimes are specified in the following way. Let us consider the market28
F or home goods. We first define the critical levels of home capacity andmonetary
expansion. y(Y*) and w(YM). for which both the liquidity andrationingconstraints
(A.6a) and (A.6b) are just binding, and for which hence the corresponding Lagrange
multipliers are zero. This gives
(A.9) =A/uhG(YM).YE)
and w(YM) =y(Y+)/k.
which implicitly determines the point (y(Y9*),(Y*)) in (y,w)—space. Consider the
assumption
€uh(ch.cf)
(A.lO) I I <1.
ech
where €y/cx denotes the partial elasticity (x/y)ay/ax. That is, the elasticity of
marginalutilityof consumption of home goods with respect to home goods is less
thanunity.
Under assumption (A.lO) the underconsumption regime, U, for the home goods
market is defined by the set of points (y,w) that fulfill the condition
w min(A/u(y.Y).w(YM)). The liquidity constrainted regime, L, is given by the
set of (y.) fulfilling the condition y ￿y(YM)andY*) ￿w ￿ ylk.The full
capacityregime,F. is given by the set of (y,w) fullfilling the condition
"￿max(A/uh(y,Y3E).y/k).
The regimes for the foreign goods market are determined
analogously.
Assumption (A.lO) determines the relative location of the regimes U, L andF.
It is not necessary for any of the results in the paper. See Svensson andvan
Wijnbergen (1986) for a more detailed analysis of the regimes and the solution,
including diagrammatic illustrations. See Svensson (1986) for details of the
solution when (A.lO) does not hold.
A2. Pricing Behavior
The solution of (A.6) and (A.S) gives rise to the output functions (9). where
the constants k and k* are included among the arguments. Now we shall derive the
pricing policy of firms, and,morespecificly. explain what determines the29
constants k and k3* in (9). As in Svensson (19S6), this is done by introducing
differentiated products and monopolistic competition along the lines of Dixit arid
Stiglitz (1977).
Let there be a continuum of home and foreign firms. The set of home firms is
represented by the unit interval, and each home firm is indexed by j, 0 ￿ j ￿ 1.
Each home firm j produces a unique differentiated home product j. 0 ￿ J ￿ 1. The
home firms face perfectly correlated economy—wide shocks to their capacity. We
hence let y denote the capacity of each home firm as well as the aggregate
capacity of the home country (since J' 0ydj =y).Similarly, there is a continuum
of foreign firms, also represented by the unit interval, and foreign firm j,
o ￿ 1, produces foreign differentiated product j. with the (across foreign
firms) perfectly correlated foreign country—wide capacity yM.
Let us now look more closely at the home firms. The consumers' preferences
for differentiated home goods are given by considering Ch in the utility function
(3) to be aggregate real consumption of home goods, an aggregate given by the CES
subutility function
rr' h/'C7h 1ah/(hl)
(A.l1) Ch =Li.Chi dij
> 1,
j=0
of consumption Chi of differentiated home product j. We identify the home price
level with the corresponding CES price index
rr1 lUh 11/(1_ah)
(A.12a) 1'h =Li h d] j=0
where hj is the home currency price of differentiated home product j. It follows
by a standard derivation that per capita demand for home product j is given by
(A.12b) ch. =hjh
h
Let Y. < y denote actual (per capita) output of home firm j. We specify that
it is given by
(A.13) Y. =min(y.ch.).30
thatis,the minimum of capacity and demand. Furthermore, let denote the (per







where 6, the rate of time preference, is given by 13 =11(1+6).The expression for
XrM/XirM.themarginal rate of substitution between nominal wealth in period t and
t+l, canbesimplified using (7) and (A.6d) which yields:
(A.15)Mi
XirM
Then the stock market value of home firm j can be written
(A.l6) =p•E[Y'./c.i']/ô.
Home firm j chooses P. to maximize (A. 16).15 In order to see what this implies.








v'>O w' v'=OF' h h h
where we have used (A.13) and (A.12b). We now realize that maximization of (A.16)
implies that P. is chosen such that the elasticity of expected discounted sales
(A.17) with respect to the relativce pricehj =hj"h
is set equal to minus
unity. (This corresponds to choosing the marginal revenue equal to zero —recall
that marginal cost is zero.) Furthermore, all home firms have identical demand.
Hence they will all choose the same home currency price Then we have
15
It does not matter whether the firm maximizes its nominal or real stock
market value since it perceives the price level in any currency as independent of
its actions.
16




wherewe have dropped the index j since the expected—discounted—sales function is
identical for all home firms, and where denotes the partial with respect to













The first—order conditions (A.19) have an intuitive interpretation. The home
firm faces an ex post price elasticity of sales equal toch when there is excess
supply, that is when Vh =0.It faces an ex post price elasticity of sales equal
to zero when there is excess demand and full capacity, that is when > 0. Since
it must settle on a price for its output ex ante, it chooses the price so that the
price elasticity of expected discounted sales equals unity. The latter is a
weighted average of the cx post price elasticity when there is excess supply
(ah)
andtheex post price elasticity when there is excess demand (zero). Thus, the
weight multiplying Uh on the left hand side of (A.19a) is the probability—weighted
share of expected discount sales with excess supply.
Now the full equilibrium is determined. The system (A.6) and (A.8)
determines, for given k and k*, the output functions Y(s,k,k) and Y(s,k,k9*), and
equilibrium consumers will consume the same quantity of home differentiated
products, ch. = =32
these together with the firms first—order conditions (A.19) determine the
constants k and k.
A3. Derivation of Y in region (U,U)
In region (U;U') the output functions are given by the system
(A.20a)uh(Y.Y3*) =A/wand
(A.20b)Uf(Y.Y3) =
Itis straight forward to derive the derivative
(A.21) Y =[_uhhA/()2]/A.
where the determinant A equals uhhuff -uhfUhf.By concavity of the utility
function the determinant is positive and Uhh is negative, and it is clear that the
derivative Y is positive.
A4. Derivation of (14)
From (13) we have
(A.22) Uh =U11°Uh and Uf =Ul'UUf.Furthermore.
















(A.28a) uh/ch =— ((7o+
Sah)/as.
(A.29b)€Uh/Cf = - s)/as.
which implies (14).
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